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Icarus Falls: The Coal Health Scandal 
Andrew Boon and Avis Whyte* 
 
I have noticed how many of my colleagues find these guys’ behaviour reprihensible [sic]. 
However, they are happy to suck up to organisations that have indiscriminately ripped 
people off left right and centre, our banks primarily. Is there a sniff of swine envy in the 
air[?]1 
 
Introduction 
 
The disciplinary processes governing lawyers have been a defining feature of self-regulation. 
In many jurisdictions, such processes are being re-shaped to conform to best practice in 
business regulation. The environment of practice for lawyers continues, however, to be quite 
different from that of other sectors. A major consideration is the fact that the practice 
environment is shaped by professionally focused rules and processes, as interpreted and 
enacted by the main actors: practitioners, organisations and regulators. The performance of 
these actors helps to determine the strength of the profession compared with other 
stakeholders, including government. Reform agendas reflect a profession’s record on 
regulatory issues. Periods of crisis or moral panics sometimes lead to reform that is reactive 
rather than strategic.2 This paper considers the impact of a major professional scandal. It 
examines how the key players interacted and how the ethical environment of practice might 
have affected an individual’s propensity for transgression. It also considers how the perceived 
lessons of the crisis influenced reform in England and Wales.  
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The professional scandal became known as the miners’ costs (or fees) scandal. It led to the 
largest disciplinary investigation ever mounted in the jurisdiction. Eventually, over 100 
lawyers from around 30 firms faced disciplinary charges, and most were sanctioned. The 
scale of the charges and the parliamentary furore that surrounded the case suggests that there 
was widespread and significant dishonesty among solicitors. The analysis in this paper 
suggests, however, that the affair had the ingredients of a ‘moral panic’. This may have led to 
the high numbers of disciplinary cases and clouded perceptions of the issues. The notoriety of 
the scandal, and the condemnation of the legal profession it usually evokes, arguably rests on 
the ‘striking off’ or suspension of a relatively small number of solicitors. The charges against 
most of those not struck off arose, however, from misinterpretation of conduct rules that were 
widely misunderstood, even by the professional regulator. This account is not a defence of 
those disciplined, or indeed, the profession’s handling of the matter, both of which deserve 
more extended examination. Rather, it is an attempt to put the miners’ costs scandal in 
context. 
The backdrop to the miners’ costs scandal was the Coal Health Compensation Schemes, 
which were set up to compensate employees and former employees in the nationalised coal 
mining industry suffering from medical conditions arising from their work. This article 
sketches the wider context in which the scandal is set, but focuses on the record of the 
disciplinary proceedings against the solicitors charged with misconduct, other documents, 
including press reports, and a small number of interviews with those involved in the 
disciplinary process and the Coal Health Schemes. The case study, of Andrew Nulty, one of 
the solicitors struck off as a result of disciplinary proceedings, was chosen because the 
charges laid are extreme examples of the allegations faced by the other lawyers disciplined. 
Also, Nulty was interesting as an individual because he courted publicity, casting himself as a 
new breed of lawyer entrepreneur, eager to be released from professional shackles by 
consumerist policy. The article begins with an outline of the disciplinary system for solicitors 
in England and Wales and the Coal Health Schemes. It then plots the emergence of 
allegations against solicitors’ firms representing claimants and the reaction of the regulator 
before focusing on the case study. The article concludes by placing the scandal and case 
study in a theoretical context.  
 
Regulation of the legal services market in England and Wales 
Solicitors constitute the largest legal profession in England and Wales, with around 160,000 
members, over 121,000 holding practising certificates.3 Despite attempts by government to 
harmonise the working practices of solicitors and barristers,4 traditional roles have been 
resilient. In the prevailing division of labour, most solicitors retain day-to-day contact with 
clients and hold clients’ money, while most barristers, numbering over 16,500,5 still maintain 
a lofty detachment, acting as consultants and advocates. After hundreds of years in the 
shadow of barristers, the solicitors’ model of practice is prevailing. The large corporate and 
commercial solicitors’ firms in the City of London now dominate international practice.6 Yet 
solicitors also service the opposite end of the client spectrum, with solo and small firm 
practitioners in provincial towns offering welfare advice to the disadvantaged. 
Solicitors are subject to a range of controls. Courts have a summary jurisdiction to punish 
breach of the duty to the court.7 Solicitors can also be subject to sanctions as a result of 
complaints.  Between 2000 and 2005, complaints averaged nearly 17,000 per annum,8 
representing one complaint per annum for every five solicitors. Various organisations have 
handled complaints against solicitors over the years.9 Their performance  frequently attracted 
criticism, especially from the office of the Legal Services Ombudsman (LSO), set up in 1991 
to review complaints handling by the professional bodies.10 Complaints against solicitors or 
barristers to the LSO could also result in sanctions, including an order that the complaint be 
re-investigated or an order of compensation. Complaints revealing inadequate professional 
service and professional misconduct were referable to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
(SDT). 
The SDT is established under the Solicitors Act 1974 and is currently funded by, but 
independent of, the Law Society. Members—appointed by a senior judge and the Ministry of 
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Justice—sit in panels of three. The SDT has wide jurisdiction and powers.11 In dealing with 
disciplinary cases it may ‘make such order as it may think fit’, which powers explicitly 
include imposing penalty and costs orders, striking off and suspension.12 Between 2000 and 
2009, the SDT heard an average of about 200 cases a year,13 representing less than 0.25 per 
cent of solicitors holding practising certificates.14 These cases resulted in annual averages of 
around 64 solicitors struck from the roll (disbarred), 38 suspended, 22 reprimanded, and 
about 10 cases annually where no sanction was imposed, apart, possibly, from a costs order. 
Appeals from SDT decisions went to the High Court.15  
Since the 1990s the legal services market was in a process of liberalisation and a state of 
considerable flux. The Legal Services Act (2007)16 represented an effort to harness the 
benefits of professionalism within a consumerist framework.17 As part of this approach it 
provided for the introduction of Alternative Business Structures (ABSs), organisations 
allowing non-lawyer capital and management.18 Since ABSs were predicted to reduce the 
cost of legal services lawyers by using more para-legal staff, many lawyers and their 
professional bodies anticipated these changes with ambivalence. It seemed that lawyers were 
being driven to be more competitive, that is, more innovative and entrepreneurial. The Law 
Society seemed concerned that it was out of step with a new regulatory philosophy and that 
its rules and approach were outdated.19 This may explain why, during the coal health scandal, 
the Law Society seemed unsure of the appropriate response.  
During most of the period under consideration here (1996 to the present), the Law Society 
maintained the SDT. Until recently, and for most of the period under discussion, it 
investigated code infractions and brought disciplinary cases to the tribunal. Forensic 
investigation of solicitors’ firms was typically conducted by review of accounts and files and 
interviews of partners and employees. Such investigations tended to be ‘triggered’ by 
complaints or whistleblowers. On 29 January 2007, anticipating compulsion under the Legal 
Services Act, the Law Society hived off its disciplinary functions to the Solicitors Regulation 
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Authority (SRA). The SRA concluded the investigations of solicitors charged in connection 
with the coal health scandal and presented cases to the SDT. The SRA is now an authorised 
regulator of ABSs20 and has substantially revised the code of conduct for solicitors so that it 
can regulate the range of solicitor organisations and ABSs under one disciplinary regime. 
 
The Coal Health Schemes 
In 1993, miners suffering from work-related illnesses commenced actions for personal injury 
against the British Coal Corporation (BCC). One set of actions concerned vibration white 
finger (VWF), a condition caused by using vibrating tools. In 1994 the VWF cases were 
consolidated into a group action, and in 1996 judgment on a preliminary issue established 
grounds for BCC’s liability for VWF.21 In 1997 lead actions established the extent of injury 
loss and damage. In 1998 negotiations took place with the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), successor to BCC, for managing the claims outside the court process. Meanwhile, in 
January 1998, the High Court found BCC negligent in relation to a second set of actions 
concerning respiratory disease resulting from work in the dusty environment of coal mines.22 
These conditions, including chronic bronchitis and emphysema, were known collectively as 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Under court direction, two time-limited 
Claims Handling Agreements (CHAs), one for VWF and one for COPD, were created to 
dispose of the many outstanding claims and to deal with new claims presented under the 
schemes.  
The Claims Handling Agreements were essentially contracts between the DTI and the 
miners’ solicitors. The CHA for COPD was negotiated between the DTI and representatives 
of the large number of firms representing claimants, referred to as the Claimants’ Solicitors 
Group (CSG).23 Each CHA defined the role and responsibilities of claimants’ solicitors, the 
DTI’s claims handlers and medical assessors and others involved in the process. In most 
litigation, courts routinely assess the reasonableness of costs,24 but it was thought that 
considerable time and expense would be saved if a tariff of scale fees payable by the DTI 
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were set for the solicitors’ costs of successful claimants. The CHAs were approved by the 
supervising judges. The DTI reported three to four times a year to the judge supervising each 
scheme, and there were further negotiations and agreements in the course of dealing with the 
claims. A steering group led by the firms of solicitors that had negotiated the CHA 
represented the collective interests of claimants in this process.  
The idea behind the Coal Health Schemes was that miners could submit details of their 
claims, which would be assessed using employment records and medical evidence, without 
each claim having to go before a court. Claimants retained the right to pursue a common law 
claim and could withdraw from the CHA and litigate. Entitlement to an award and its value 
were determined by the terms of the CHA. Compensation would be payable according to a 
tariff. To begin the claims process, each claimant completed an application. COPD claimants 
provided details of ill health, work history and smoking habits and took a Spirometry Test for 
lung function.25 This record was lodged with a solicitor, who registered it with the claims 
handler. About 50 respiratory specialists were employed at assessment centres throughout the 
country to assess COPD claims.26  
COPD claims were closed to new applications at the end of March 200427 with the intention 
that claims by live claimants would be processed by the end of 2007 and those by the estates 
of deceased miners by 2009. In 2005 the Parliamentary Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry noted that the volume of claims was higher than expected. At the time of judgment 
in the lead case there were 6,000 identified COPD cases, and this figure was expected to rise 
to a maximum of 70,000. The Department admitted, however, that it had no basis for 
estimating the total number of applicants. In fact, 172,000 COPD claims had been settled in 
full by January 2005, and final offers had been made in another 179,827 cases.28 In all, £1.1 
billion in compensation had been paid for VWF and £1.29 billion for COPD,29 whereas 
British Coal originally had allowed only £50 million in their accounts to cover their liability. 
Worse, the settled claims were only part of a total of an estimated 576,000 COPD claims30 for 
which the DTI expected to pay about £7.5 billion in compensation.31 Members of Parliament 
were incandescent, demanding to know who was to blame. 
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On 21 July 2005, Malcolm Wicks, Minister for Energy at the DTI, announced an external 
review of the schemes to be undertaken by Stephen Boys Smith, a former Home Office 
official, and two others.32 Suspicions regarding the operation of the scheme were reflected in 
the remit, which included reviewing ‘the integrity of the administration of the scheme for 
dealing with coal health claims; to identify any specific measures needed to improve the 
administration of the scheme; to consider whether there are adequate safeguards in place to 
prevent, detect and pursue fraud …’33 The Boys Smith report, released in December 2005, 
criticised the choice of such schemes to administer large numbers of cases and the cost 
involved.34 While there was no evidence of fraud, the report intimated that anti-fraud 
measures that had been implemented later in the schemes would have reduced the possibility. 
Legal costs were identified as an area of potential saving. While the costs tariff negotiated 
with the Claimants’ Solicitors Group appeared reasonable at the start of the scheme, it was 
arguably too generous for routine claims handling. Responding to the report, the Minister 
claimed that some £200 million could have been saved by reducing ‘unnecessary’ legal 
costs.35  
A later report revised the various estimates of cost but also failed to find fault with the miners 
or their lawyers. In April 2007 a National Audit Office report estimated that when all claims 
were settled £4.1 billion would have been paid in compensation, with a further £2.3 billion 
spent on administration costs, payments to miners’ legal representatives, contractors, and the 
Scheme’s own legal costs.36 The report identified ‘significant weaknesses’ in government 
handling of the Coal Health Scheme. For example, the costs agreement initially reached with 
solicitors had no mechanism for review, with the result that the COPD scheme alone paid 
£295 million more than necessary.37 Moreover, whereas the median award under the COPD 
scheme was £1,500, the average solicitors’ fees per case were £1,920.  
The unexpectedly high cost of the Coal Health Scheme was caused by the explosion of 
claims, far more than budgeted for. As to costs, while the lawyers’ rates of pay may have 
been over-generous for routine claims handling, it was hardly the CSG’s fault if the 
government’s agencies had negotiated a bad deal. Further, the accusations subsequently 
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levelled against solicitors—that they overcharged the clients they represented under the Coal 
Health Scheme—did not add to the Scheme’s cost to the public. These issues did not, 
however, lead solicitors to the SDT. What many people think was the core of the scandal was 
that the solicitors subsequently disciplined had charged their clients costs additional to the 
scale fees paid by the DTI under the Coal Health Scheme. Arguably, however, they had every 
right to make additional charges. It was how those charges were levied that led to disciplinary 
action and determined the different degrees of culpability found.  
 
‘Overcharging’ 
A popular misconception in the coal health scandal is that solicitors were found guilty of 
overcharging. In most cases, this was not so. The rule infractions tended to be more technical, 
concerning breaches of strict requirements for collecting costs from clients. There are broadly 
two ways in which successful litigants may be required to pay their own solicitor’s costs in 
bringing a claim. The first way is when clients do not recover all their costs from the losing 
party and are then required to pay the solicitor for the extra work done on the case—so-called 
solicitor and own client costs.38 The second way is when clients have entered a conditional 
fee agreement under which the other side is not required to pay the uplift on the fee permitted 
by such agreements. 
Solicitor and own client costs arise in litigation because, under English law, the court has a 
wide discretion to order one of the parties to pay some or all litigation costs to one of the 
parties. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the costs of the successful party.39 
These are usually standard costs, meaning the costs that have been reasonably incurred.40 
Individual items of costs may also be disallowed, and these costs may be recoverable from 
clients as solicitor and own client costs. This usually arises when costs were incurred as a 
result of the client’s unreasonable behaviour or instructions.41 Clients who are dissatisfied 
with the solicitor’s bill can apply for detailed assessment by the court.42 Although the 
principle of proportionality applies to costs, it is recognised that in small claims in particular, 
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costs may exceed awards.43 There is no suggestion that, in the miners’ cases, additional costs 
were recoverable from clients as costs unrecovered from the other side.  
In addition to litigation costs incurred that are not the responsibility of the other side, 
solicitors can potentially charge their clients costs over and above those paid by the other side 
under conditional fee agreements (CFAs). From 1995 CFAs were permitted in, inter alia , 
personal injury actions,44 thereby introducing a limited exception to Practice Rule 8, which 
prevented solicitors charging a contingency fee in litigation.45 As with contingency fees, 
CFAs allowed solicitors to finance litigation in return for a success fee recoverable if the 
claimant won.46 Unlike contingency arrangements, however, rather than calculate fees as a 
percentage of damages, the solicitor’s success fee was calculated as an ‘uplift’ on costs, by as 
much as high 100 per cent in cases of high risk.47 The form of CFA, or ‘No Win No Fee’ 
agreement, was usually a variant of a Law Society model precedent. Although claimants 
could cover the risk of paying the other side’s costs with ‘after the event’ insurance,48 they 
might still be liable for the insurance premium and, depending on the terms of the CFA, their 
solicitor’s disbursements if they lost.49 If they won, clients who signed CFAs were required to 
pay their own solicitor’s success fee, which was not recoverable from the other party.  
The terms of the Coal Health CHAs specified that panel solicitors would be paid fixed fees 
by the DTI for all successful claims. The scale of costs for the COPD scheme ranged from 
£1,700 to £2,300 depending on the value of the claim. The agreement with the DTI declared: 
‘these agreed fees will represent the total sums payable to the Claimant’s representatives in 
relation to the claim. The DTI will not be liable for any additional fees or disbursements …’50 
The DTI scheme, therefore, did not explicitly provide that solicitors could not seek costs from 
miners in either successful or unsuccessful claims, only that the DTI would not be liable for 
additional costs. Construing the terms of the CHA in context, it did not address the possibility 
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of additional fees being chargeable by solicitors to clients.51 None of the official reports argue 
that the DTI scale costs took account of the solicitor’s risk in pursuing unsuccessful claims. 
There would, therefore, arguably be no impropriety in principle if success fees were charged 
to miners applying for damages under the Coal Health Schemes. The main argument that 
justified CFAs in ordinary litigation applied. Solicitors, particularly in the early days of the 
Coal Health Scheme, had no way of predicting the success rate of claims and therefore ran 
the risk of working for free in an unknown number of unsuccessful cases.  
While there was some similarity between coal health claims and ordinary litigation, justifying 
the use of CFAs, the case for them was not watertight. While solicitors ran some risk in 
relation to unsuccessful coal health claims, this was not very substantial compared with the 
risk in ordinary litigation. For example, they probably did not undertake the volumes of work 
associated with most personal injury litigation. Further, they paid no disbursements, since all 
medical tests were arranged by the DTI. Even if it were accepted that they ran no very 
substantial risk, it would not mean that CFAs were unacceptable; the degree of risk could and 
should have been reflected in the percentage uplift on the success fee. So, as it became clear 
that the risk of failure was small in relation to the numbers of cases presented, the percentage 
of the success fee charged could have been reduced. In summary, there was no reason in 
principle why solicitors should not charge coal health applicants a modest success fee under a 
CFA, assuming that the CHA did not preclude this. 
The conclusion that CFAs were not forbidden by the CHAs was confirmed on 27 July 2006. 
Mitting J, appointed by the Lord Chief Justice to supervise the VWF CHA, considered 
whether success fees were recoverable from the DTI. The question arose when the Access to 
Justice Act 1999 allowed solicitors’ success fees, until then only recoverable from their own 
client, to be recovered from the other side as part of the successful litigant’s costs,52 together 
with basic charges, specific insurance premiums and the self-insurance costs of membership 
organisations.53 Mitting J held that, in principle, the DTI could be liable for success fees, and 
the Court of Appeal agreed.54 Such fees were recoverable in any sort of ‘proceeding’ for 
resolving disputes, not just proceedings commenced or contemplated in a court.55 The Court 
of Appeal noted that, when negotiating the CHAs, ‘[t]he parties can be taken to have realised 
that Parliament could change the law. By providing that success fees were recoverable from 
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unsuccessful respondents it has changed the law in a manner beneficial to claimants and their 
solicitors and detrimental to the DTI. The consequences of that change cannot be excluded 
simply by consideration of the circumstances in which the CHA was agreed.’56  
As the subsequent disciplinary cases show, the approval by a senior court of the principle of 
claiming success fees in coal health cases was not the end of the matter. Even if entering into 
a CFA with Coal Health Scheme claimants was permitted in theory, in practice there was 
considerable scope for errors that could render such agreements unenforceable. Solicitors 
were required to observe a number of requirements imposed by the founding statutes57 and by 
regulations made in 2000 covering the contents of the agreement58 and the provision of 
information to clients.59 One of the most significant requirements so far as the disciplinary 
charges were concerned was the requirement that legal representatives should inform clients, 
before the agreement was made, of the circumstances in which costs would be payable by the 
client to the representative, how those fees could be assessed, the relevance of any ‘before the 
event’60 insurance, and the availability and appropriateness of other methods of financing.61 
This information was required to be given orally, whether or not it was also given in 
writing.62 Solicitors failing to observe these rules might also, in theory, face disciplinary 
charges if, for example, the circumstances caused a conflict of interest.  
One of the practices that caught out many solicitors was attempting to recover success fees 
calculated as a percentage of the claimant’s compensation, rather than as a percentage of 
costs. This could result in disciplinary charges since solicitors were potentially in breach of 
Practice Rule 8, which provided: 
 
A solicitor who is retained or employed to prosecute or defend any action, suit or other 
contentious proceeding shall not enter into any arrangement to receive a contingency 
fee in respect of that proceeding, save one permitted under statute or by the common 
law.63 
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Some solicitors might have assumed that the Coal Health Schemes were not an ‘action, suit 
or other contentious proceeding’, since the cases were proceeding under CHAs, arguably a 
mere contractual arrangement, rather than through the courts. This assumption was proven 
false when, on the same occasion that he ruled that success fees were recoverable, Mitting J 
held that the VWF claims constituted ‘litigation’. This meant that any deduction of a 
percentage of compensation was an illegal contingency fee and contrary to Rule 8.  
By 2006, therefore, the right of solicitors to make additional charges to clients whose claims 
they presented under the Coal Health CHAs was reasonably well-established, provided they 
followed the statutory and regulatory rules for charging such fees. This involved using an 
agreement in which, inter alia , the success fee was calculated as a percentage of the costs, not 
the compensation, and that all other requirements were met, including the obligation to 
explain the agreement and its consequences to the client before it was entered into. For many 
solicitors, breaches of the requirements relating to CFAs were tied up with infringement of 
professional rules regulating payment for referrals. The issue of referrals was complicated by 
the profession’s ambivalence about preventing members paying for cases, but also by 
confusion about what constituted a referral.  
 
Payment for referrals 
For much of the period of the Coal Health Schemes, payments for referrals were prohibited 
by the Solicitors Introduction and Referral Code 1990, which stated that ‘[s]olicitors must not 
reward [introducers of clients] by the payment of commission or otherwise’.64 Solicitors were 
even to be wary of relying on limited sources of referral65 and were required to conduct six-
monthly reviews to ensure that the code had been complied with.66 If they found that they 
received more than 20 per cent of their income from referrals from a single source, they had 
to consider whether that proportion should be reduced.67 Solicitors were also obliged to draw 
these provisions to the attention of those introducing clients to them.68 The Law Society was 
under pressure, including from some solicitors, to soften these requirements, or even to 
permit payment of referral fees. One advocate of a change in policy was the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), a government body, which, since 1973, had policed markets for anti-
competitive practices. An OFT report in 2001 concluded that the ban on referral fees was 
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obstructing the development of an online market for introductions, to the disadvantage of 
solicitors.69 Noting that a Law Society Regulation Review Working Party was considering 
reforming restrictions on cold calling, the report welcomed ‘indications that this restriction 
might soon be abolished’.70 Yet, in 2002, two motions before the Law Society Council 
calling for the abolition of the Introduction and Referral Code were narrowly defeated. 
The referral fee issue was brought to a head by litigation unconnected to the Coal Health 
Schemes. The Accident Group (TAG), a claims management company with around 15 per 
cent of the UK market, had passed personal injury claims from the public on a ‘no win, no 
fee’ basis to around 600 solicitors’ firms.71 Faced with larger than anticipated numbers of 
losing claims, insurance companies that had issued ‘after the event’ insurance to claimants 
were contesting liability to indemnify on a number of grounds.72 One of the issues that arose 
in the litigation was payments by solicitors to TAG’s sister company, Accident Investigations 
Limited (AIL), of £350 for each case. Although this payment was described as an 
investigations fee, the senior costs judge, Master Peter Hurst, suggested that it might violate 
Rule 2(3) of the Law Society’s Introduction and Referral Code if payments to an online 
claims management company were not justified by the work done.73 Hurst’s decision that, in 
that situation, ‘[t]he solicitor cannot charge his client for it and the defendants do not have to 
pay it’74 was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2004. It appeared that many payments that 
solicitors had not thought of as referral fees would, in future, be treated as such.  
As the implications of early decisions in the TAG litigation hit home, the Law Society’s 
uncertainty over the Introduction and Referral Code was succinctly captured by an 
announcement in the Law Society Gazette in July 2003 that:  
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The Law Society has received a number of queries, in light of recent case law, with regard to 
whether, and in what circumstances, payments made by solicitors to claims management 
companies amount to referral fees in breach of the current solicitors’ introduction and referral 
code.75 
 
The Gazette reported that the ethics committee was revising guidance on referral fees and that, 
while the Council ‘would be interested in looking at draft rules which permit payments for 
referrals in certain circumstances that could not have a negative impact on the client’s 
interests and the solicitor’s independence’, any changes would take time to draft and be 
approved. In the meantime, and ‘[d]espite efforts to abolish the introduction and referral 
code … [i]nstead, it is to be enforced properly’. A lengthy statement on what constituted 
referral fees followed: 
 
Turning now to the current position, the subject of payments for referrals is dealt with 
in section 2(3) of the code. This provides that ‘solicitors must not reward introducers by 
the payment of commission or otherwise’. The problem with this provision has always 
been trying to interpret what constitutes a ‘reward’. Obviously any payment which is a 
direct reward for the introduction of clients is not permitted, but many schemes now 
involve payments for a variety of services which can, or might, include a reward to the 
introducer.76 
 
The Gazette then worked through a number of examples. One was charging the same fixed 
fees for each case, which was likely to be seen as a referral fee because the amount of work 
per case might vary. The second was solicitors paying sums as a condition of joining 
schemes, so they had no choice but to ‘buy’ the services. Because the ‘reward’ to the 
introducer was the agreement to buy the services, this also was likely to be seen as a referral 
fee. Both examples were directly relevant to the circumstances under which solicitors 
obtained Coal Health Scheme clients.  
The Law Society’s statement ended, however, with the following assurance: 
 
The Law Society’s compliance board has, however, given careful consideration as to 
whether the regulation directorate of the Society should undertake a general 
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investigation into firms who were members of schemes, and who were, in the light of 
the judgments, paying referral fees in breach of the rule. On balance, the compliance 
board has concluded that little regulatory purpose would be served in pursuing such an 
investigation. This decision is limited in nature and does not affect existing 
investigations.77 
 
The problem for many solicitors caught by this ‘clarification’ of the rules was that miners had 
already signed up to make payments to their unions or other introducers before the solicitors 
were instructed. Accepting the terms in those agreements was, in most cases, a condition of 
receiving the work. Solicitors had not queried the unions’ right to charge the fee or their own 
obligation to collect it from the clients. They had certainly not thought to advise clients that it 
might not be in their interests to pay it or that they might avoid paying it by taking their 
business elsewhere.  
In October 2004 the Introduction and Referral Code was amended by the addition of section 
2A, containing seven paragraphs of additional rules. The amended Introduction and Referral 
Code qualified the previous blanket prohibition, stating that ‘a solicitor must not make any 
payment to a third party in relation to the introduction of clients to the solicitor, except as 
permitted below’.78 Payment was then allowed provided that ‘immediately upon receiving the 
referral and before accepting instructions to act the solicitor provides the client with all 
relevant information concerning the referral and, in particular, the amount of any payment’.79 
Additionally, the solicitor had to be satisfied that the introducer had provided all relevant 
information to the client and had not acted in such a way that, if the introducer were a 
solicitor, the actions would breach the practice rules. This was intended, in particular, to 
cover restrictions on the content of advertising applying to solicitors.80  
The amended Introduction and Referral Code did contain a provision that created some 
potential for confusion. It was stated that the prohibition on payments to third parties 
included ‘any other consideration but does not include normal hospitality, proper 
disbursements or normal business expenses’.81 This was intended to clear up doubt about the 
payment to third parties of their ‘genuine expenses’, but such a distinction was, in many cases, 
difficult to draw. Where, for example, the deduction was said to be for the union’s 
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administration, marketing or handling charges, solicitors tended not to investigate. An even 
more difficult example in the coal health cases arose when a miner’s trade union membership 
had lapsed and he agreed with the union to pay a fee in lieu of membership dues in return for 
the union handling the claim. In these circumstances, miners then signed an agreement 
instructing the solicitors to pay this ‘membership fee’ if the claim was successful. It may not 
be surprising that solicitors did not foresee the possibility that this would be construed as a 
referral fee. 
It is arguable that some solicitors receiving claims under the Coal Health Scheme were 
unlucky to be charged with making payments that were subsequently classified as referral 
fees. They may not have considered that miners’ trade unions were ‘introducers’ covered by 
the code, or they may have considered the payment to be recompense for the introducer’s 
genuine expenses. Nevertheless, they should all have realised that such payments potentially 
compromised their independence, a fundamental principle of Rule 1 of the Code of Conduct, 
by undermining the right of clients to make an unfettered decision about appointing the 
solicitor of their choice. Even had the 2004 amendment been in place at the relevant time, full 
disclosure would have been required to regularise such payments. Further, in those cases 
where solicitors were using a CFA to recover the expense of paying a referral fee to an 
introducer, they potentially broke Rule 3.03, which prohibited solicitors from sharing 
professional fees with any person who was not either a lawyer or employee.82  
In most cases disciplinary charges relating to referral fees accompanied other charges. 
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity regarding what constituted a referral fee, and the profession’s 
stance on referral fees, were raised by respondents before the SDT.83 The fact that the issue of 
referral fees was raised in coal health cases, despite the 2003 decision of the Law Society not 
to launch new investigations of referral payments in panel schemes and ‘without prejudice’ to 
existing investigations, suggests either that such cases were ongoing at that time, that there 
were other charges besides the referral issue, or that there was some other reason for the 
prosecution. It seems that there was considerable political pressure on the Law Society to 
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take action on the ‘overcharging’ issue and to bring disciplinary charges against coal health 
panel firms. 
 
The role of the regulator 
The attitude of the Law Society to costs for Coal Health Scheme cases changed considerably 
over time. In 2001, the Law Society opined that solicitors were entitled to charge above the 
DTI scale costs, provided the amounts were not unreasonable and the client had been 
properly informed about the charging arrangements.84 Initially, the main pressure to change 
that view came from Parliament, where reports of the general profligacy of the Coal Health 
Schemes caused controversy. It did not take long for politicians’ irritation to focus on the 
miners’ costs issue. In December 2003 Nigel Griffiths MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for Coal Health, wrote to panel firms asking for confirmation that they were not charging 
clients additional fees. If they were, he said, he requested repayment. Solicitors who did not 
respond or refused to give the undertaking were removed from the list of solicitors provided 
to potential claimants. This did not, however, preclude claimants using these solicitors.  
In January 2004 the Law Society’s Compliance Board warned that solicitors making an 
additional charge to clients might be subject to a finding of providing inadequate professional 
services.85 To rebut such an allegation, solicitors would have to show that they had fully 
informed clients at the start of the matter and the additional charge was reasonable in the 
circumstances. Sufficient information (for cases started after April 2000) would have to 
include advice that many other solicitors did not make any additional charge. The Law 
Society subsequently wrote to all solicitors handling COPD and VWF claims, reminding 
them to review all cases handled to ensure that they complied with this guidance.86  
In 2005 the circumstances surrounding the Boys Smith report suggested that the Law Society 
had been under pressure from government for some time. The minister commissioning the 
report, Malcolm Wicks, noted that some solicitors had double-charged clients or ‘invited’ 
them to pay extra fees while making them feel obliged to pay. ‘These are essentially matters 
about conduct within the legal profession and the DTI has no direct role,’ he said. ‘We have, 
however, raised the issues with the Law Society in the past, and I will continue to make clear 
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to them the importance of taking these issues forward rigorously and proactively.’87 Boys 
Smith’s report endorsed the Law Society’s new, hard line approach,88 noting: 
 
The schemes did not explicitly rule out solicitors charging fees of successful claimants … 
Neither the DTI nor the solicitors anticipated this as a problem at the time the schemes 
were negotiated, though in the case of the solicitors there was a potential conflict in that 
their interests and those of the claimants they represented were not necessarily at one on 
this matter.89  
 
The report itself also argued that the legal profession rather than the government should take 
action. 
In January 2006 the Law Society had established an independent complaint-handling arm, the 
Legal Complaints Service (LCS). In the same month the Law Society Gazette announced that 
the Law Society had responded to the government’s call ‘to clamp down on solicitors dealing 
with mining claims’ by looking into more than 30 firms about which it had received 829 
complaints.90 The Law Society concluded 511 of the complaints received, and £150,000 in 
compensation was paid to complainants following conciliation. In March 2006 the Law 
Society again urged any of the 515 firms that had ‘overcharged’ miners to repay costs.91  
In April 2006 a special report by the Legal Services Ombudsman criticised the Law Society 
for failing to investigate miners’ complaints properly.92 The Ombudsman concluded that the 
Law Society had let complainants down.93 The Law Society responded that criticism of its 
handling of miners’ complaints was misplaced; it had received 1,000 complaints and 
investigated 700 at that point, referring only 12 to the Legal Services Ombudsman, ‘an 
extremely low referral rate’.94 Peter Williamson, Chair of the Law Society Regulation Board, 
added:  
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45 solicitors have now been referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. This has 
been the largest series of investigations we have ever undertaken into a single issue.95 
 
The pressure did not abate. On 11 July 2006 Lord Lofthouse of Pontefract, a former miner, 
castigated the solicitors involved in ‘double charging’, accusing the Law Society of being ‘in 
a coma’ until 2004 and waking up only ‘because of intense parliamentary pressure’.96 
Lofthouse promised to ‘use my remaining time on this earth to try and ensure that every last 
penny is paid back, with interest and compensation on top’.97 In the same debate life peer 
Lord Sawyer, a leading trade unionist and labour politician, declared an interest as the non-
executive chair of the supervisory board for Thompsons Solicitors, the trade union firm 
which, as personal injury specialists, had handled many coal health claims. His perspective 
on the problem was that, ‘on the introduction of the coal health scheme, more than 700 law 
firms, many of which had no experience of trade union work, let alone miners’ work, became 
involved in what can only be described as a feeding frenzy to make money from the scheme’, 
but he agreed with Lofthouse that, on the evidence, the performance of the Law Society had 
been poor. 98  
In 2007 the Audit Office reported that the LCS had received 1,671 service complaints 
relating to the Coal Health Compensation Schemes up to 31 March 2007, 183 of which had 
been lodged since January 2007.99 The LCS had recovered some £570,000 in deductions 
from 15 law firms and had referred three firms, representing around 130 claims, to the 
Solicitors Regulatory Authority for refusing to make redress.100 The SRA was established in 
January 2007 as the independent regulator of solicitors and took over responsibility for 
bringing cases to the SDT. At the point of handover only one case arising out of the 
investigations of firms connected with the scandal had been heard. By April 2007, when Lord 
Lofthouse presented a report on the debacle to the minister, the SRA had conceded that the 
principle of ‘double charging’ was wrong, irrespective of what the charges were or how they 
were made. Peter Williamson, now chair of the SRA, told the BBC:  
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I’m ashamed that solicitors whose costs are being met by the Government should do 
such a thing. Solicitors are supposed to put their clients’ interests first, and that is a 
fundamental, professional principle.101  
 
This was the contextual and legal backdrop to proceedings before the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal. 
 
The Disciplinary Context 
The ethical principle underpinning most of the charges in the SDT was breach of fiduciary 
duty to clients. At the start of the period covered by the CHAs, conduct was governed by the 
Solicitors Practice Rules.102 Rule 1 outlined the basic ethical principles applicable to 
solicitors as follows: 
 
A solicitor shall not do anything in the course of practising as a solicitor, or permit 
another person to do anything on his behalf, which compromises or impairs or is likely 
to compromise or impair any of the following: 
(a) The solicitor’s independence or integrity; 
(b) A person’s freedom to instruct a solicitor of his or her choice; 
(c) The solicitor’s duty to act in the best interests of the client;  
(d) The good repute of the solicitor or of the solicitor’s profession; 
(e) A solicitor’s proper standard of work; 
(f) The solicitor’s duty to the court; 103 
 
The allegation in many cases was that one or more of the first four of these principles had 
been infringed. The main charges were often that the solicitors, in the course of practice, did, 
or permitted others to do on their behalf, things that compromised or impaired their 
independence or integrity, a person’s freedom to instruct the solicitor of their choice, their 
duty to act in the best interests of clients, and the good repute of the solicitors’ profession. 
The essence of nearly all the charges was that solicitors improperly deducted monies from 
client damages. Some did so because they thought they were entitled to take cases on a 
contingency, or ‘no win, no fee’, basis and deduct a fee from clients’ damages. Others did so 
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in order to recoup charges that miners had paid to an intermediary, like a trade union, which 
had processed the case.  
While many solicitors did not follow the detailed rules that would have rendered deductions 
from damages acceptable, the SDT concluded that most of the cases did not involve 
dishonesty. According to information provided by the SRA to the Ministry of Justice for 
written answer in the House of Commons, 115 solicitors in 25 firms were referred to the SDT 
in connection with the miners’ costs scandal,104 but these figures will need revision.105 
Hearings before the SDT began in 2006 and ended in 2010. Three solicitors were struck off 
and three suspended for periods of between six months and four years. A further 47 solicitors 
were fined106 and six were reprimanded. A handful of those mentioned in the parliamentary 
reply were not pursued or the allegations were withdrawn. Of the solicitors charged, 
regulatory settlement agreements,107 covering three firms and 16 solicitors in these firms, 
were approved by the SDT.  
Solicitors receiving the more serious sanctions of striking off or suspension were prohibited 
from holding themselves out as solicitors or undertaking ‘reserved activities’, like litigation 
and advocacy. These individuals attracted nearly all the attention of the national press and 
vindicated the charge that solicitors were unfairly profiting from the suffering of miners 
dying from illnesses the Coal Health Schemes had been established to compensate. In the 
most serious cases, common failings were accompanied by findings of dishonesty. In these 
cases the SDT applied what the House of Lords, in Twinsectra v Yardley, had called the 
combined test: (i) was the defendant’s conduct dishonest by the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people? and (ii) did the person realise that by those standards his 
conduct was dishonest?108  
 
Andrew Joseph Nulty, Avalon, solicitors 
Some solicitors became poster boys for the scandal because of the astonishing wealth they 
amassed. One of these—Andrew Joseph Nulty of Avalon, solicitors, from Warrington in 
Cheshire—was the third solicitor struck off in the miners’ compensation scandal.109 Nulty 
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was born in 1966 and grew up on a council estate in Liverpool, the second youngest of five 
children. He claimed in an interview that his father and grandfather were coal miners, but 
other sources claimed his father was a used car salesman.110 Nulty was admitted as a solicitor 
in 1996, at the age of 30, somewhat later than the norm. A Liverpool newspaper qualified 
rumours of a glittering media career. It suggested that he had not spent the period before 
qualification presenting a late-night 1990s pop show, The Hitman and Her, although it 
seemed that he had presented a BBC children’s programme, Move It, and held an Equity 
card.111 He was also said to be a keen rugby player, turning out regularly as flanker for Orrell 
Rugby Union Football Club.112 
Nulty joined the Manchester-based firm Mainman Partnership, where he specialised in 
personal injury. By 2001 he had risen to partnership. A section in the Law Society Gazette 
reporting on solicitors transferring between firms noted:  
 
In Manchester, Andrew Nulty has left the Mainman Partnership to set up specialist 
personal injury law firm Avalon. He is joined in partnership by Ike Ibeto, also from 
Mainmans, and Malcolm Trotter, who departs Poole & Partners. Mr Nulty’s younger 
brother Martin, who has a law degree but is not qualified, has joined as a consultant 
and marketing director.113 
 
While Avalon, solicitors was indeed established in Warrington in 2001, later reports 
described Nulty as a sole practitioner.114  
Nulty started Avalon with 200 personal injury cases brought from Mainman, including some 
under the CHAs. He rapidly built on this legacy, in the early 2000s running an advertisement 
in the national press: 
 
PUBLIC NOTICE 
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Are you a coal miner who has suffered from chest disease or breathing problems? The 
government is urging miners and families of deceased miners to come forward. 
PLEASE DO NOT LEAVE IT UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE! 
 
The advertisement was placed in the name of The Miners & General Workers Compensation 
Recovery Unit, suggesting perhaps a government or trade union body. There was no direct 
connection between Avalon and any such body. As a result of such marketing over 30,000 
claimants were attracted to Avalon in three years. The 2007 National Audit Office report 
listed Avalon among the firms receiving the highest fees from coal health. Thompsons, a 
leading national firm, had earned £123.6 million. In seventh place was Andrew Nulty’s firm, 
Avalon, which had been paid £35.1 million ‘by taxpayers’ for handling COPD claims. Unlike 
lawyers at Thompsons, however, Nulty shared profits with only one other equity partner. 
Although by 2004 Avalon was employing about 70 staff, they were mainly unqualified. The 
exception was John Trotter, who was hired as a salaried partner for one year from the firm’s 
inception in 2001 and became an equity partner before leaving in 2004. 
In 2005–6 Avalon grossed £21.2 million in fees, with a net profit of £15.5 million, making it 
the 88th highest earning firm by turnover. Because Nulty’s sole partner at this time was 
Anthony Chorlton (who was not subject to disciplinary proceedings), Avalon’s profit per 
equity partner was £7.75 million, considerably larger than the earnings of equity partners in 
the large corporate commercial firms, which were news if they topped £1 million.115 In fact, 
Nulty took the lion’s share: £13 million in 2006 compared with Chorlton’s £2.5 million.116 
This probably made Andrew Nulty the highest earning lawyer in Britain.117  
Early in summer 2006 Chorlton contacted The Lawyer , a magazine typically devoted to the 
activities of large firms.118 He suggested that Avalon might make that year’s UK 100 Annual 
Report rankings.119 On 21 August The Lawyer trailed the firm’s appearance in the rankings 
with an article on Avalon.120 Nulty said he felt that:  
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… law firms have been held back not only by the Law Society, but the profession and 
lawyers themselves. We don’t use the nomenclature of lawyer in this practice. We feel 
[legally] unqualified people are better managers.121  
 
The Lawyer reporter asked Nulty how a solicitor could make £13m in a single year.122 He 
replied that the most important part of Avalon’s practice was its Research and Development 
department. ‘We spend a fortune on this,’ he said. ‘We have a meeting every Sunday morning 
to discuss ideas … We’re now moving on to endowment mis-selling, which will be 
massive.’123 Nulty claimed that Avalon had already spotted its next three business lines, 
although he would not identify them.124 
The story of the ‘rags to riches’ lawyer was picked up by national media, but was not 
reported in the positive way that Nulty presumably anticipated. On Tuesday 22 August 2006 
Avalon cancelled a face-to-face interview and photo session with The Lawyer. Later that day 
Chorlton called to say that, on the advice of Avalon’s solicitors, Radcliffes Le Brasseur, there 
would be no further comment, specifically on the Law Society investigation. Since then, The 
Lawyer suggested, ‘Nulty has been permanently “unavailable”’.125 By this time The Lawyer 
had detected a good, albeit negative, story. It reported that Nulty had been charged with 
assaulting a policeman the week before126 although the case was dropped.127 The 
investigation of Avalon and other panel firms was underway by this time, although the initial 
hearing in relation to Avalon did not take place until 2008. In the meantime, Nulty left 
Avalon. In 2007 he took a personal fortune estimated at about £17 million to Spain, where he 
was said to keep a villa and a yacht.  
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SDT hearing: 27–29 April 2009 
The cases of Andrew Nulty and John Trotter were eventually heard by the SDT in April 
2009.128 The applicant, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, was represented by Timothy 
Dutton QC. The respondents were separately represented, Nulty by Gregory Treverton-Jones 
QC. An application to have the proceedings struck out or stayed had failed on 1 July 2008. 
The tribunal had also declined to hear the case in camera , on the grounds that there was no 
exceptional hardship or prejudice to either respondent to justify such a move. At the April 
hearing Treverton-Jones again applied to have the proceedings adjourned or stayed sine die, 
but the tribunal refused to reconsider unless there was fresh evidence.  
Treverton-Jones then produced a medical report stating that Nulty was so distressed he could 
not cope with the paperwork required for the hearing and did not want to attend for fear he 
might feel aggressive and behave inappropriately. The tribunal heard detailed medical 
testimony confirming Nulty’s distress. A doctor told the SDT that, although Nulty was ‘a 
very wealthy man and was now a tax exile’, he had lost ‘everything else such as his career, 
his marriage and his life, which were more important things’.129 When she interviewed him in 
June 2008 he had seemed pleasant but anxious, but by September he was tearful and 
entertaining suicidal thoughts. He had found the press very intrusive and had felt unsafe in his 
own home.  
Treverton-Jones said Nulty had inexplicably driven his motorcycle off a 50-metre cliff the 
previous November. He suggested that there might be no public interest in pursuing Nulty. 
Although the miners’ cases had excited great interest in 2006, he said, the press were not 
even there to hear the present proceedings; interest had ‘evaporated’.130 If any case ever 
illustrated that money could not buy happiness, he said, this was it. Citing authority that it 
was not in the public interest to pursue proceedings when there was unchallenged medical 
evidence of a lack of fitness to appear,131 counsel again applied for adjournment sine die. 
For the applicant, Dutton objected to the medical evidence on the ground that Nulty had 
refused to attend a meeting with a psychiatrist nominated by the SRA, although he had 
attended his own doctor twice, once before the application to stay the proceeding in June and 
once after, in anticipation of the present hearing. He submitted that the evidence showed that 
Nulty could attend the SDT hearing. There was no corroborative evidence of a suicidal risk 
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apart from the motorcycle accident, ‘which had been presented extremely thinly’.132 The SDT 
noted that the respondent apparently visited his children in the UK regularly, no GP records 
were presented to support the submission, and there was no suggestion that Nulty wished to 
appear at a later date. The SDT therefore declined Nulty’s request to adjourn the case sine die, 
stating that it must be heard to ‘ensure the proper protection of the reputation of the 
profession’.133  
Presenting the applicant’s case, Dutton told the SDT that a Forensic Investigation Officer 
(FIO) of the Law Society had initiated an inspection of Avalon’s books on 11 October 2004 
and completed a Forensic Investigation Report on 9 June 2005. This established that Avalon 
had created a department dealing with the DTI scheme claims in 2003 and that 99 per cent of 
the firm’s work was British Coal related. This investigation supported several charges against 
Nulty and Trotter. The first charge comprised allegations regarding breaches of the 
overarching principles of Rule 1 of the Solicitors Practice Rules 1990, actions that 
compromised or impaired Nulty’s and Trotter’s independence or integrity, their clients’ 
freedom to instruct a solicitor of their own choice, their duty to act in the best interests of 
clients, and their own good repute and the good of the solicitors’ profession.  
These general allegations were evidenced by breaches of specific rules of the Solicitors 
Practice Rules, which governed conduct occurring before 1 July 2007,134 and the Introduction 
and Referral Code 1990. In a written response to the Law Society dated 25 August 2005 the 
respondents denied all breaches ‘save only the very trivial breach in relation to Practice rule 
15’, an admission that referred to the charge of sending client care letters without details of 
costs. The sending of client care letters was, however, linked to a more serious allegation 
regarding costs and the levying of contingency fee payments. Before dealing with that 
allegation the applicant presented evidence on the allegation that, contrary to Conduct Rule 3, 
the respondents had accepted instructions and referrals of business in contravention of the 
Solicitors Introduction and Referral Code 1990 both before and after March 2004, when the 
Code was amended. There were two main sets of circumstances in which additional sums had 
been charged: first, where no conditional fee agreement was signed, and second, where there 
was a conditional fee agreement.  
The second charge related to the first set of circumstances, but where there was no CFA. In 
these cases the Law Society’s Forensic Investigation Officer (FIO) found payments to a 
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number of companies in Avalon’s records, all from profit costs and recorded as 
disbursements. It was contended that such payments were a breach of the Introduction and 
Referral Code unless they were genuinely for work done. Additionally, it was alleged that 
there was an aggravating feature: Nulty, or his nominees, had an interest in the introducing 
firms. There were payments to the Miners & General Workers Compensation Recovery Unit, 
the name that appeared on the original advertisement calling for miners to come forward. 
Although Miners & General Workers Compensation Recovery Unit sounded like a trade 
union body and advertised that it acted on behalf of miners’ unions, it was also a commercial 
company, incorporated in November 2001. Nulty’s brother and both Nulty and his brother’s 
future wives were officers and shareholders. The other companies to which payments for 
referrals were made were called Sureclaim Ltd and Miners Welfare & Compensation 
Recovery Limited. It was alleged that Nulty was a shareholder and Director of Sureclaim and 
his brother and both wives also held an interest. It was a clear conflict of interest for a 
solicitor to make payments to a company referring claims to his own firm. 135 
Nulty denied any interest in Miners Welfare & Compensation Recovery Limited, or any link 
between the companies. The SDT was told, however, that an Advertising Standards 
adjudication in February 2004 had found that Miners and General was a subsidiary of 
Sureclaim. In most of Avalon’s case files where CFAs had not been agreed, there were 
signed agreements with Sureclaim, stating that the claim would be handled by nominated 
solicitors and that a fee based on a percentage of damages was payable for the company’s 
role in handling the claim. Since there was no evidence that clients were informed that 
referral fees were payable, they could not have been told that Nulty had an interest in the 
companies receiving such a fee.  
The second set of circumstances, giving rise to the third charge, concerned situations in 
which conditional fee agreements were issued. The way in which the charge was framed in 
relation to this situation was complex. The specific breach alleged related to Practice Rule 9, 
which prohibited solicitors from entering arrangements with firms charging contingency fees 
in personal injury cases.136 This provision was concerned with preserving the solicitor’s 
independence and ability to act in the best interests of clients when making or receiving 
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referrals. The applicant’s case was that Sureclaim Ltd was clearly a business which supported 
or prosecuted claims arising as a result of death or personal injury and, it was contended, it 
solicited and received contingency fees in respect of such claims from Avalon. Indeed, Mr 
Dutton suggested that while Avalon had received over £40 million from coal mining cases, 
Sureclaim had received another £25 million.  
The fourth charge was that Nulty and Trotter had entered into arrangements to receive 
contingency fees not permitted under statute or by common law on their own account, 
contrary to Rule 8 of the Conduct Rules. The SDT accepted that claims under the CHAs were 
contentious litigation. It heard that Avalon had issued documents described as a conditional 
fee agreement (CFA) under which they agreed to pay a ‘success fee’ of 15 per cent plus VAT 
from payments recovered under the scheme. The fundamental problem was that a success fee 
based on a percentage of damages was a contingency fee. Dutton provided examples of how 
the deductions had affected claimants. In the case of Mrs D, a widow, a claim in respect of 
her deceased husband was settled for £13,068.64 with costs of £3,285.73 paid by the DTI. A 
‘success fee’ of £2,303.35 was transferred to the office account. There was no evidence that a 
bill had been rendered, a requirement of the Solicitors’ Account Rules for transferring money 
from client account to the solicitor’s office account.  
The SDT heard that nearly £265,000 in ‘success fees’ had been deducted from miners’ 
compensation before the adverse publicity in 2003. Nevertheless, even though the firm wrote 
to clients in January 2004 stating that they would receive 100 per cent of their damages, the 
firm deducted a further £43,258.12 as success fees after that date. A schedule produced for 
the FIO showed that only £30,495.90 had been repaid, and only after clients complained.  
Nulty’s defence to the charge that Avalon had charged contingency fees was that other 
solicitors and referrers had claimed that charging success fees under the CHAs was ‘the done 
thing’. It was not, however, the principle of success fees that was the problem but the method 
of calculation.  
The fifth charge was that the respondents had failed to give adequate information to clients in 
accordance with the Solicitors Costs Information and Client Care Code (‘Client Care Code’), 
contrary to Rule 1(a), (c) and (d) and/or 15 of the Conduct Rules. The tribunal heard that 
although contingency fees were illegal, additional charges would have been allowed had 
Avalon disclosed the true position on costs to clients in advance. In a majority of cases, 
however, the client care letter required to be sent out at the beginning of the case did not even 
state that the DTI would be paying Avalon’s costs on successful claims. Indeed, it appeared 
that Avalon attempted to conceal rather than disclose the circumstances under which they 
made extra charges. This conclusion was supported by a practice, described as a pattern, 
whereby Avalon obtained signed CFAs from miners. Avalon would typically send a client 
care letter, as required by the conduct rules, ignoring the need to explain the basis on which 
charges would be made. Avalon’s letter did, however, enclose a form confirming instructions 
to act for clients to sign. On receipt of the signed instructions to act, Avalon sent the CFA 
with a covering letter saying it had been ‘mistakenly omitted’ from the first letter.137 Of the 
19 files inspected from just one of Avalon’s teams, this ‘mistake’ occurred 17 times.  
The sixth charge was pursued against Nulty alone. On the face of it the allegation was 
technical, although it may be indicative of Nulty’s disregard for the both letter of the law and 
the rules.138 During correspondence with the Law Society it was noted that a non-solicitor 
was described on Avalon’s letterhead as ‘managing partner’. This was contrary to the 
Solicitors Publicity Code 1990, which prohibited holding out non-solicitors as solicitors139 
and non-partners as partners.140 This person then wrote to the Law Society saying that he had 
resigned and his name would be removed from the letterhead. This was confirmed by a letter 
from Nulty on which the same person’s name appeared as ‘consultant’, a designation that 
also offended the code by implying that the person held a current practising certificate.141 
The seventh charge was also laid only against Nulty. It alleged that he had acted in breach of 
Conduct Rules 1(a) (independence and integrity) and 1(d) (good repute of solicitor or 
profession)142 in writing a letter to the DTI dated 3 March 2004 which was misleading, 
dishonest and sent with intent to mislead the recipient of the letter. At a meeting in October 
2004 Avalon had claimed not to have received a letter from Nigel Griffiths MP in December 
2003 but acknowledged receiving a follow up letter sent in February 2004. This later letter 
asked the firm to confirm that it had not taken a fee in addition to that paid by the DTI but, if 
it had, to remit any non-DTI fee to clients. The firm replied: 
 
… we can confirm that our British Coal scheme was instigated in August 2003 and 
confirm that no monies whatsoever are to be deducted from the client and as a practice 
we rely solely upon receiving fees set by the DTI.143  
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 In fact, as previous evidence established, Avalon continued to collect ‘success fees’ for at 
least another four months. Nulty claimed that he did not recall sending the letter, but the 
signature appeared to be his.  
In delivering its judgment the SDT found many ordinary breaches of the Solicitors Practice 
Rules, but in almost all of these there were additional and unusual factors. The payments to 
the claims management companies introducing miners’ cases violated the referral code, and 
advertising by the companies contravened the Solicitors Publicity Code. The fact that Nulty 
or his relatives had an interest in these companies, a clear and undisclosed conflict of interest, 
was an exacerbating feature. This was ‘a network of companies which was designed to 
confuse with regard to the payment of referral fees’.144 Similarly, the SDT found that the coal 
health cases were contentious business, despite the CHA, and that the success fee deductions 
were therefore illegal contingency fees. To add to this breach, however, there was the 
confusing sequence of client care letters, which seemed to serve no purpose but to hook 
clients before springing the CFA on them. The SDT found that Nulty had designed the three-
letter system to confuse clients regarding the payment of referral fees. The tribunal noted that, 
by the time Avalon repaid deductions from damages to miners, the damage to the reputation 
of the profession had been done.  
The SDT also accepted that Nulty had sent the letter to the Secretary of State. Any honest and 
reasonable member of the public would have regarded the reply, particularly the assertion 
that no money was deducted from clients, as dishonest under the Twinsectra  test.145 The SDT 
therefore found that Nulty had been dishonest in his reply. According to the transcript, 
however, while his conduct in relation to the referral fee and contingency fee charges was 
described as a ‘calculated deception’ and ‘a disgrace to the profession’,146 an explicit finding 
of dishonesty was not applied to either. Nevertheless, the tribunal ‘had no hesitation in 
concluding that the public needed to be protected from [Nulty]’.147 In addition to being struck 
from the roll of solicitors, he was ordered to pay 90 per cent of the Applicant’s costs, 
estimated at £180,000. The SDT found that Trotter, the second respondent, had not directly 
benefited from the referral fee arrangement but had overseen some of the activity and had 
received complaints as Complaints Partner. He must have been aware that what was going on 
at Avalon was wrong. He was fined £15,000 and ordered to pay £10,000 towards costs.  
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In most of the cases before the SDT involving coal health firms the implication of the 
decision is that there was not merely a technical breach of the rules, but such breaches 
constituted cheating of clients. Cheating is the violation of rules in order to take advantage of 
someone with whom one is in a cooperative relationship148 and therefore a betrayal of trust. 
‘Cheating’ is not of itself a disciplinary offence, just as it is not a crime,149 but a component 
of offences. Striking off a lawyer usually requires a finding of clear moral wrongdoing150 so, 
for example, in a recent case, it was held that all but trivial cases involving dishonesty should 
result in striking off.151 In this case study, the transcript implies that the dishonesty lay in the 
response to the letter to the DTI denying that Avalon was deducting money from miners’ 
damages. As regards the deductions from damages, therefore, it is not immediately obvious 
where the line between ‘mere cheating’ and dishonesty lies.  
 
Aftermath 
The Coal Health Scheme continued to be controversial. In July 2009 a report in the Law 
Society Gazette suggested that solicitors may have been insufficiently diligent in pursuing 
compensation.152 A medical professor explained that COPD was easy to diagnose but it was 
difficult to separate work related causes from others, like smoking. Damages were reduced 
when non-work related causes were implicated in an individual’s condition. A few points 
either way on a causal spectrum could make a big difference to damages. Yet, the CHA fixed 
costs regime provided no incentive to challenge the initial diagnosis. Under the COPD 
scheme solicitors collected the basic costs, £1,920, for merely accepting the first offer. If they 
challenged the inital diagnosis they only got an additional £298 if successful and nothing if 
unsuccessful.  
The Law Society Gazette article suggested that solicitors could maximise their incomes by 
processing large numbers of claims rather than fighting the marginal ones.153 A table, 
showing the average settlements achieved by the firms submitting the most claims under the 
COPD scheme, revealed widely different average levels of compensation. Thompsons, the 
national, specialist personal injury firm, had the best average, £9,202 per claim, while Avalon 
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achieved only £2,375 per claim,154 the lowest average settlement of the ten firms. While 
different rates of settlement may be explained by the types of claims that came to different 
firms, ‘under-settlement’ could not be ruled out. Indeed, this possibility threatens a new wave 
of coal health litigation in relation to the VWF scheme.  
In January 2011 Judge Hawkesworth ordered that a number of actions alleging losses arising 
out of solicitors’ failure to diligently pursue aspects of claims under the VWF scheme be 
stayed pending hearing of test cases between 11 and 13 April in Leeds County Court.155 At 
the hearing (which took place on 3 May 2011) the judge found that just over half of the 
107,065 claimants who might have secured ‘services awards’ under the VWF scheme had not 
received such payments. He noted that solicitors were already advertising for claimants with 
‘under settled’ claims.156 Judge Hawkesworth ordered that all such cases should be defined as 
part of the ‘VWF Professional Negligence Litigation’.157 At the time of writing there is no 
indication of similar actions by COPD claimants, possibly because of evidential problems.  
In 2011 there was another twist when a Nottinghamshire miner sued for recovery of the scale 
fee charged by a claims company created by one of the miners’ unions. The miner, a former 
union member whose subscription had lapsed, had signed an agreement to pay a fee that 
varied according to the compensation recovered. He had recovered £10,545 and paid £352.50 
to the claims company on settlement. He objected that he had not been told that the costs 
would be paid by the DTI if he succeeded or that he could go to a solicitor, avoiding the fee. 
He was not the only miner in this situation. The court heard that the claims company’s assets 
had rocketed from virtually nothing to £8 million by dint of the schemes.  
The case was appealed to the High Court,158 which assiduously explored grounds on which it 
might find against the claims management company and for the miner. It proved difficult, 
however, to find a legal principle to support a decision in his favour. It was not argued on 
appeal that the union’s duty was the same as a solicitor’s or that there was any duty to advise 
on conflict of interest. In the absence of such a duty there was no legal principle on which to 
hang a remedy: no misrepresentation, no implied term that was necessary to give the contract 
business efficacy, and no unconscionable bargain. The claimant therefore failed, illustrating 
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the key role played by technical, professional rules in compensating miners and punishing 
solicitors.  
The experience of the use of claims management companies is cautionary. These companies 
have been touted by proponents of reform as supporting access to justice, but they depend on 
referral fees for profits. In his report on the cost of civil litigation, Lord Justice Jackson stated:  
 
It is a regrettably common feature of civil litigation, in particular personal injuries 
litigation, that solicitors pay referral fees to claims management companies, before-the-
event (‘BTE’) insurers and other organisations to ‘buy’ cases. Referral fees add to the 
costs of litigation, without adding any real value to it. I recommend that lawyers should 
not be permitted to pay referral fees in respect of personal injury cases.159 
 
Apparently as a result of its experience in the coal health scandal, the Law Society called for 
a ban on referral fees,160 as did the Bar.161 In May 2011 the LSB decision paper on referral 
fees stated: 
 
The Board continues to hold the view that the purely regulatory case for a general ban in the 
legal services market has not been made out. This is because sufficient evidence of consumer 
detriment, which would have been needed to merit a ban, has not been found.162 
 
In September 2011, despite probable incompatibility with UK and EU competition law,163 the 
government issued a press release announcing that it would adopt Jackson LJ’s 
recommendation.164 At the same time, however, as legal aid cuts bite deeper there is 
increasing pressure to legalise contingency fees.165  
The press continued to pursue Andrew Nulty after the case ended, rehashing the story with 
pictures of his villa and accounts of his lavish Spanish lifestyle. The web page of a barristers’ 
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set, Falcon Chambers, suggested that one of their barristers was briefed to obtain a freezing 
injunction over property belonging to Nulty in the UK in order to prevent removal of assets 
overseas pending recovery of the costs of disciplinary proceedings.166 The proceedings were 
apparently settled before a full hearing.167 In 2010 a polo team based in Gibraltar reported 
Andrew Nulty as a player in a local match, describing him as follows: 
 
Formerly of Knutsford Cheshire who now resides in Gibraltar a lawyer by trade but prior to this worked 
as a television presenter with the BBC. Andrew has always been a keen and competitive sportsman 
having played rugby for Orrell RFU and represented his country in Athletics. A proud father of his two 
boys Ashton and Thatcher he now enjoys his hobbies of Motor sport, MX and endure [sic] together with 
his new found passion for Polo. Having broke his hand less than a month ago in a riding accident he is 
determined to play today against doctors orders and he is looking forward to continuing his passion for 
Polo next season and travels to Argentina and Dubai this winter to hone his skills.168 
 
Some of the other dramatis personae also found new fields of endeavour. In May 2011 BBC 
Business News reported that the banking industry had abandoned a legal fight over the mis-
selling of payment protection insurance (PPI), which covers loan repayments in the event of 
the insured’s illness or loss of job. In the wake of a finding of mis-selling, the Financial 
Services Authority, the ‘City watchdog’, ordered banks to re-examine previous sales, even 
where complaints had not been lodged or had been rejected. Banks set aside large sums to 
pay compensation; Lloyds Banking Group £3.2bn, Barclays £1bn, and HSBC £269m, while 
RBS added £850m to £200m already set aside. Banks had teams working around the clock 
identifying potential claimants and refunding PPI payments.  
On 6 May 2011 a ‘worldwide consumer complaint reporting website’ focused on a company 
called Gladstone Brookes Ltd. In extensive TV advertising and on its website, a goldmine of 
consumer oriented information and rhetoric, Gladstone Brooks Ltd claimed to be ‘the UK’s 
leading PPI claims company’, informing consumers that:  
 
Banks are businesses, they exist to look after your money and turn a profit. However, 
making huge profits by mis selling PPI on loans, credit cards & mortgages which their 
customers sign up for is unethical. In April 2010, the same banks that have been fined 
millions for mis selling were fighting tooth and nail to keep on selling it. Thankfully, 
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Point of Sale (POS)—selling PPI at the same time as a selling a loan or credit card—
has now been banned, demonstrating how much of an issue PPI mis selling from the 
banks really is. The PPI mis selling scandal is thought to affect up to twenty million 
people. If you have taken out a loan, credit card or mortgage in the last ten years then 
contact Gladstone Brookes today and claim back PPI from lenders and credit card 
providers. Fill in our online claim form or ring us …169 
 
Gladstone Brooks charged a £50 refundable registration fee plus 25 per cent of sums 
recovered for claiming repayment of PPI payments. An online enquiry to 
Moneysavingexpert.com170 asked whether this was good value. Other contributors to the 
website were incredulous. All that was required to reclaim PPI was to post one letter and 
there was even a good chance that the bank would find you first. The website claimed that 
Gladstone Brooks was managed by Anthony Chorlton, formerly of Avalon solicitors, that one 
of two women company directors was Chorlton’s wife,171 and that Andrew Nulty was 
connected to the company. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this discussion is to throw light on the question of why lawyers break their 
code of ethics, exploring the inter-relation of three factors: the propensity of the individual 
for transgression, the nature of the organisation they belong to, and the regulatory 
environment. As Abel discovered, the relatively light literature on theories of professional 
discipline invites consideration of the more extensive literature on ‘white-collar crime’,172 a 
term coined by Sutherland in 1939,173 in exploring some of these issues. The criminological 
literature on personal motivation is relevant because, although professional infractions are 
rarely prosecuted as criminal acts, the circumstances and psychology of perpetrators are 
similar.174 Work on white-collar crime offers useful insights into the way organisations might 
affect people’s behaviour, but little consideration of how this applies to business oriented 
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professions like Law. There is even less in this literature on the impact of regulators on 
transgression.  
Theorists after Sutherland assert that deviance results from a coincidence of motivation and 
opportunity, the attractiveness of the latter being determined by prospective gains, potential 
risks, compatibility with ideas, beliefs and rationalisations, and any other available 
opportunities (the actor’s opportunity structure).175 This does not explain why some succumb 
to temptation and others do not. As seems obvious, delinquency is probably the result of 
individual propensity for transgression; one of the few commonplaces of criminology is that 
those involved in one type of illegitimate activity are more likely to be involved in others.176 
Abel concludes that the attorneys in his case studies involved in financial impropriety were 
driven by ‘need or greed’.177 Although this is a deliberate simplification, Nulty’s behaviour 
justifies a little deeper examination against this generalisation.  
Acquisitiveness is a common motive for deviance, but it is not always driven by greed. 
Coleman suggests that we need only acknowledge that wealth and success are the central 
goals of human endeavour to understand this.178 The ‘culture of competition’ fuelled by 
capitalism causes blurry lines between entrepreneurship, commercial innovation and deviant 
economic activity. Social inequality causes crime at both ends of the social scale because the 
wealthy come to feel that their power is legitimate and their exploitation of others justified.179 
For some, the outcome is its own justification; only ‘the most capable and the hardest-
working individuals emerge victorious’.180 More strange, however, was the fact that the 
wealth accrued by these means did not seem to constitute a particularly significant part of 
Nulty’s fortune. The SDT noted that improper deductions had eventually been repaid, so 
given his reported fortune and Spanish property, the conclusion must be that Nulty had 
become a very rich solicitor by legitimate means. If Avalon’s success meant that need was 
not a factor, why did Nulty need referral companies, the ‘two-letter system’ and flawed 
conditional fee agreements to generate relatively small sums? 
                                                          
175
 JW Coleman, ‘Competition and Motivation to White-Collar Crime’ in N Shover and JP Wright (eds), Crimes 
of Privilege: Readings in White Collar Crime (Oxford University Press, 2001) 341. 
176
 Those convicted of white-collar crime often have previous arrests. K Schlegel and D Weisburd, Introduction 
to White Collar Crime Reconsidered (Northeastern University Press, 1992) 362 and D Weisburd, E Chayet and 
E Waring, ‘White Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some Preliminary Findings’ (1990) 36(3) Crime and 
Delinquency 342. See also DJ Newman, ‘White-Collar Crime: An Overview and Analysis’ (1958) 23 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 737; T Hirschi and M Gottfredson, ‘Causes of White Collar Crime’ (1987) 25 
Criminology 957. 
177
 Abel (n 172) 492. 
178
 Coleman (n 175). 
179
 J Braithwaite, Inequality, Crime and Public Policy (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) ch 10. 
180
 Coleman (n 175) 348. 
One explanation for the acts that brought Nulty before the SDT is that his schemes were 
implemented while Avalon was struggling to establish itself and before coal health proved 
such a goldmine. Wheeler, however, suggests a theory explaining acquisitiveness that derives 
from neither need nor simple greed which appears persuasive. He argues that some people 
stop acquiring wealth at a certain level, whereas, for others, utility grows at higher levels of 
wealth acquisition.181 Among this latter group, actors operating in high risk taking are more 
likely to see themselves ‘as pitting their wits against those of the system in some very high 
stakes games’.182 Acquisition of wealth at these higher levels may ‘take the form of a true 
pathology of personality—a person oblivious of the pattern though engaged in it’.183 This 
may explain why, despite the notoriety of the miners’ cases, Nulty drew attention to Avalon’s 
profits with the claim to inclusion in The Lawyer listing. The observation that such a person 
is totally unprepared for being caught and ‘treated like a criminal’184 appears to capture 
Nulty’s reaction to disciplinary charges.  
In Nulty, we see a competitive individual keen to play the ‘game’ of acquiring wealth. He is 
dismissive of ‘petty regulation’. He is surprised to be challenged. He does not see that the 
issue is as serious as the authorities make out. He thinks that medical reports may dispose of 
the SDT hearing. He is like Abel’s attorneys in Lawyers in the Dock, who seem to believe 
that they are above the law.185 Nulty’s behaviour is consistent with the use of ‘neutralisation 
strategies’ to rationalise and limit symbolic constraints on behaviour.186 One of six strategies 
Coleman says are used by individuals charged with white-collar offences to justify their 
actions187 is arguing that rules are an unjust or unwarranted interference in a free market.188 
Objection to the Law Society’s role in regulating solicitors’ engagement with the legal 
market was expressly referred to in Nulty’s exchange with The Lawyer. Nor has experience 
of discipline apparently changed Nulty’s mind about the irrelevance of professional control. 
Otherwise, how could his polo club biography proudly refer to his previous career as a lawyer?  
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The role of organisations in professional deviance is somewhat underplayed, partly because 
those prosecuted are often not controlling significant operations.189 The same has been the 
case in professional practice in relation to discipline: the focus of attention, certainly before 
the SDT, has tended to be the individual rather than the organisation. One issue that is 
identified in both the criminological literature and the literature on professional discipline is 
the prevalence of those with low social standing before courts and tribunals. Indeed, 
Sutherland’s original purpose in focusing on white-collar crime was to challenge the myth 
that deviance was the preserve of the lower classes. He argued that the statistics could be 
explained by the fact that prosecutions might not be brought against those from elite groups, 
or that they failed when they were.190 Abel’s review of the literature on the professional 
sphere also found that sole practitioners and small firm lawyers are disproportionately 
represented in disciplinary cases.191 This means that examples are often small-scale, repeated 
infractions, frequently resulting from ignorance, indifference or inattention192 and tending to 
be seen as individual, ‘unique and unrepeated’.193 How far does the pattern of discipline in 
the coal health scandal confirm that serious sanctions fall on solicitors from smaller units?  
The solicitors that were struck off as a result of the coal health scandal were not from small 
organisations, but neither were they elite. For example, despite an impressive turnover and 
large workforce, Avalon was not a typical medium to large law firm. It only had the same 
number of partners or, indeed, qualified staff, as a small law firm. These key personnel, 
usually only two partners, operated with minimal peer constraints. As in small firms, there 
was nobody to question the propriety of the firm’s routines. Avalon’s business model was 
also unusual for a law firm. It had large numbers of one kind of client suffering one kind of 
harm and even seeking redress from one entity. Having adopted this modus operandi to deal 
with the coal health claims, Avalon had limited expertise to deal with other kinds of work. 
The way it intended to deal with this problem in the future was possibly glimpsed in the 
unfinished interview with The Lawyer. The plan was to identify an area where compensation 
claims could be made routine, to focus all attention on it until that seam of work was 
exhausted and to then move on to another such area. As the coal health cases illustrate, 
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organisations are important in understanding opportunity structures for linking with 
consumers using, and misusing, legitimate business techniques.194 
This other issue relating to the size of organisation is whether small units are especially 
vulnerable to corruption. Sutherland originally proposed that it is the power of elites to evade 
sanctions, not purity, that explains their relative absence before courts.195 The limited 
evidence from this case study suggests that the truth may sometimes lie between these 
possibilities. Elite organisations may be treated differently by regulators, but they also 
respond swiftly and positively to threat, doing more to stave off the threat of discipline. The 
handling of Thompsons, solicitors, in the coal health scandal illustrates this. Thompsons was 
alleged to have paid over £10 million to miners’ unions as ‘administrative charges’,196 yet it 
was one of the firms that entered a regulatory settlement agreement with the SRA.197 The 
charges listed in the agreement include paying referral payments for miners’ cases, the 
deduction of contingency success fees and failure to provide adequate information. The fact 
that Thompsons was offered such a compromise is noteworthy in itself. Unlike Avalon, 
Thompsons reacted quickly when the storm over deductions from miners’ damages broke, 
refunding £3.6 million to 6,304 clients. The regulatory settlement agreement cites as 
mitigation the firm’s swiftness and proactivity in remedying infractions, concluding that it ‘is 
not in the public interest for the matter to be brought to the SDT’.198 Further, however, unlike 
the process where similar regulatory settlements were agreed, we found no record of the 
Thompsons agreement ever being approved by the SDT. 
The third actor influencing the environment of practice is the regulator. As to the Law 
Society’s role during the coal health scandal, if it was not ‘in a coma’ during the crisis, as 
Lord Lofthouse alleged, it did not act decisively. A consideration that may have stayed the 
Law Society’s hand was the fact that doubt and ambiguity surrounded almost every issue, 
including the profession’s right to regulate. In addition to threatening self-regulation, the 
government was intent on removing all barriers to competition and access, including 
restrictive ethical rules, and on encouraging the legal profession to be more business oriented 
and entrepreneurial. A limited form of contingency fee was introduced, while rules against 
referrals were cast as anti-competitive, out-of-date and unenforceable. It is arguable that this 
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market-driven philosophy, which implicitly espoused an entrepreneurial spirit over a public 
service ethos,199 caused moral ambiguity and confusion. It may be charitable to suggest that 
this contributed to delay in getting to grips with the scandal. It seems likely, however, that the 
uncertainty surrounding referral fees and, to some extent, conditional fee arrangements, 
exacerbated the crisis, especially since unclear boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
money-making activity is one of the six neutralisation strategies identified by Coleman.200  
In the event, the regulator charged a large number of coal health panel solicitors with 
offences connected with the schemes. This apparently included some charged with referral 
fee offences, despite the moratorium announced when the rules were ‘clarified’ in 2003. This 
raises the issue of whether they were pursued because of pressure to discipline solicitors. It is 
clear that, even before the House of Lords weighed in, coal health solicitors, and the Law 
Society, were being pursued by ministers. As can be seen from the brief extracts cited, the 
House of Lords managed to raise the moral stakes. In many respects, therefore, the miners’ 
costs scandal resembles a ‘moral panic’,201 a term coined by Stanley Cohen to describe an 
episode or group posing a threat to societal values and interests.202 In the classic scenario the 
negative impact of behaviour is identified by ‘moral entrepreneurs’, generating hostility 
towards a group, the ‘folk devils’. A widely supported consensus develops and the ‘folk 
devils’, often weak and disorganised, are unable to resist disproportionate opprobrium and 
action. To some extent, the literature may also throw some light on the significance of the 
group identity of the victims of the scandal in creating this dynamic.  
The literature on white-collar crime suggests that there are ‘unapproved victims’, 203 meaning 
those not considered fair game, even by perpetrators. The miners, despite early suspicion that 
some might have brought fraudulent claims, eventually fitted this bill. They were portrayed 
by Lord Lofthouse as admirable, even heroic, yet vulnerable to exploitation. In addition to 
establishing the moral dimension of the panic their Lordships may also have helped to 
generate the volume of complaints needed to build a profile of cases and convince the 
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authorities to prosecute.204 In Cohen’s theory, while the typical moral panic passes, the 
volatile political situation it causes often leads to disproportionate action. In considering the 
consequences attributable to the miners’ costs scandal, it is debateable where they begin and 
end. It has apparently informed the risk-based regulation policies being developed by the 
SRA.205 It was expressly cited by the SRA and LSB206 as justification for the massive fines 
brought in to punish breaches of licence by ABAs.207 Less tangible, but perhaps more 
significant, however, has been the loss of the legal profession’s claim to the ‘moral high 
ground’ in ethical matters.208 This may contribute to the professional body’s contribution on 
regulatory issues being much less authoritative than it once was.  
 
Conclusion 
One of the questions posed by analysis of disciplinary cases is whether anything useful can 
be learned in terms of regulatory policy. It is arguable that analysis of the coal health scandal 
contains some lessons for the future as well as judgement on the past. It illustrates, for 
example, the difficulty inherent in regulating situations where clients have only superficial 
relationships with their lawyers. Large numbers of cases processed by unqualified staff can 
generate huge profits yet constitute a significant risk to the reputation of the legal profession. 
This obviously poses significant risks in a market moving towards greater reliance on internet 
communication, where a high premium will be placed on the trustworthiness of legal 
providers. In the introduction to Lawyers in the Dock, Abel quotes Barber’s observation that 
‘trust is ideally the primary mode of control in the relations between professionals and their 
clients’.209 Trust is particularly important in relationships between lawyer and client that are 
‘one off’, like the firms’ relationship with individual miner clients. The scandal demonstrated 
not only the potential for large-scale exploitation but also the difficulty of detection. In the 
event, the miners found champions, but there will inevitably be situations where consumers 
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are unaware that they have been scammed, unsure of their rights, or disinclined to take 
trouble for the sum involved. This is therefore a challenge for regulatory policy.  
In professional relationships, Abel wrote, trust is underwritten by institutions that ‘sanction 
betrayal’,210 but the current thrust of regulatory policy in England Wales is informed by risk 
analysis and focused on firms.211 This emphasis recognises the fact that organisations can 
drive ‘good people to do dirty work’, but also that the opposite could be true.212 Risk-based 
regulatory policy may assume that small firms are responsible for disproportionate numbers 
of complaints and disciplinary infractions because they lack the infrastructure essential for 
quality performance, increasing the risk of poor work, financial impropriety and under-
capacity.213 The impact of infractions is generally assumed to be low, including the effect on 
the profession’s reputation. The Avalon case study demonstrates that this is not so. It suggests 
that regulation should focus on the risk posed by an entity, in terms not only of the likelihood 
of deviance but also of the consequences in the event of deviance. 
A final question posed by the case study is whether the culture of practice can be changed 
and, if so, how. A specific issue is whether it is sufficient to have a few people responsible 
for ethical compliance, in charge of large numbers with little or no ethical awareness or 
responsibility. An alternative or complementary strategy is to have communities of practice 
where large numbers actively participate. The advantage of this approach is that it 
acknowledges that the ethicality of practices often depends on context; in some jurisdictions, 
for example, referral and contingency fee arrangements may be criticised214 but do not fall 
foul of conduct rules. This links to the point that where there is doubt there is scope to come 
to a self-serving conclusion; but for the stringency of professional rules, it might have been 
difficult to discipline many of the lawyers involved. It is a rich irony that, during the coal 
health scandal, politicians were calling for fewer ethical restrictions on lawyers. As the 
referral fee episode illustrates, professional bodies like the Law Society need to resist such 
calls when they judge it right to do so. Such bodies could continue to have an important role 
in the formation of professional ethics, despite the severance of their responsibility for 
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regulation. In that role, they should not abandon principles because there is competitive and 
governmental pressure to do so. Discourses of professionalism, consumerism and competition 
need to engage and complement each other in the new order so as to enhance prospects for 
the ethical delivery of legal services.215 
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